EVOLUTIONARY TRUST GAMES
Evolutionary trust games model how trust relationships emerge in a social system.
We focus on N-player games where some players initially invest their assets and other players can be either trustworthy or untrustworthy.
We have applied these games to real problems such as the sharing economy or climate change decisions.
Trust has implications for social systems, including ethical considerations, crosscultural dimensions in an organizational context, and shaping human relationships. As individuals use trust to manage complexity, relationships emerge. This, in turn, increases complexity and thus creates more reinforcement and opportunities for trust to spread. Researchers recently found that individuals are more trustworthy when having uncalculating cooperation, as this behavior is utilized to signal trustworthiness.
Evolutionary game has been used for modeling trust. Trust games are sequential in nature. The most well-known version of trust games involves interactions between an investor (or truster) and a trustee. Fundamentally, it represents a two-player game where the investor begins with an initial stake of value and can decide whether to keep or transfer it to the trustee. Later, the trustee must choose how much to return to the investor (or not at all).
Main collaborators in this research line